

EUBULUS, OLYNTHUS, AND EUBOEAE*

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I

In early spring 349/8 B.C., Athens, at Eubulus' direction, intervened militarily in Euboea. It was at the behest of Plutarch, dynast of Eretria, that this decision was made (Plut. *Phocion* 12.1).¹ Yet the preservation of Plutarch's power was not the object of Eubulus' concern; Phocion, we know, expelled the dynast after Tamynae (Plut. *Phocion* 13.4), and later turned the Eretrian government over to the people (Dem. 9.57). Nor was crushing the pan-Euboean movement Athens' objective; it was, it seems, only after Phocion's arrival on the island that that movement in fact matured.² Philip, however, had meddled in Euboea in the 350s (Dem. 4.34, 37), and was to again in the next decade (see e.g. Aeschin. 2.12). In fact, there is reason to imagine that it was the threat of his intervention that Plutarch used to rouse Eubulus to commit troops to the island, though in the end these claims proved groundless.³

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¹ See H. W. Parke, "Athens and Euboea, 349-8 B.C." *JHS* 49 (1929) 246-52; G. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," *CQ* 12 (1962) 122-40; esp. 127-30; P. A. Brunt, "Euboea in the Time of Philip II," *CQ* 19 (1969) 247-51; J. M. Carter, "Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus," *Historia* 20 (1971) 418-29, esp. 421-28; G. Cawkwell, "Euboea in the Late 340's," *Phoenix* 32 (1978) 42-67, esp. 45-49; and N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* 2 (Oxford 1979) 317-19. (Hereafter Cawkwell's "The Defense of Olynthus" will be cited as "Olynthus," while his "Euboea in the Late 340's" will be cited as "Euboea," and his "Eubulus," *JHS* 83 (1963) 47-67 will be cited as "Eubulus.")

² For a summary analysis of the situation on the island, see Brunt (above, note 1) 248-51.

³ The question of whether Philip actually had a hand in the Euboean difficulties of 349/8 B.C. is vexed; for a succinct summary of the debate, see Hammond and Griffith (above, note 1) 318, note 2, with the conclusion that Philip probably did intervene. For me, however, Cawkwell's emendation of Aeschin. 3.87 ("Olynthus" 129-30), when viewed in the context of Athenian reaction to the peace negotiated in the summer of 348 B.C. (see Dem. 5.5 and schol. and Carter [above, note 1] 426-27) makes clear that there was no actual Macedonian presence on the island in 349 B.C. Conversely, that Eubulus, in the crisis atmosphere of 349/8 B.C., would have elected to intervene in an isolated local struggle (so Cawkwell, "Olynthus" 130) seems implausible. It was, as I suggest here and later, the threat and not the fact of Philip's intervention that moved Eubulus.

Earlier in the same year, Philip had begun to move against Olynthus. Yet here Eubulus had elected against military aid of any size; and this in the face of the *Olynthiacs*.⁴ Strategic considerations have been put forward in explanation of Eubulus' decision: the past faithlessness of the Olynthians, the likelihood that campaigning in the north would have been protracted and thus costly, and the impossibility of preventing Philip from striking elsewhere.⁵ Yet these are not completely satisfying as an explanation; for had Athens wanted to engage Philip in the north, we need not doubt that he would have obliged, and in the end the disposition of the Olynthians would not have counted for much. Thus, in assessing Eubulus' policies in 349/8 B.C., we are compelled to ask why Euboea warranted the commitment of substantial military aid against only the threat of Philip, and Olynthus not against the fact of his presence.

With some consistency, scholarship has assumed the centrality of political and military considerations in Eubulus' policies.⁶ Unamended, such assumptions tend to make the principal accomplishment of his ascendancy—his restoration of the Athenian economy⁷—little more than a by-product of some larger political or military program. Yet insofar as it was Eubulus' intent to restore the Athenian economy, it is more reasonable to assume that political and military decisions issued from economic concerns than the reverse. My intent, however, is not to review Eubulus' entire career, arguing the ubiquity of economic motives. Rather, I will review certain key features of his economic recovery program (II), and then argue that such was the nature of these as virtually to determine the military and political responses to Olynthus and Euboea (III).

II

For Athens the Social War proved disastrous.⁸ The secession of key allied states effectively crippled the Second Confederacy (Diod. Sic. 16.7.3;

⁴ Cf. Philochorus on the aid sent (*FGrH* 328 F 49–51) with Demosthenes' recommendations (Dem. 1.17–20; 2.11–13; 3.10–13). See also Cawkwell, "Olynthus" 130–34 and Carter (above, note 1) 418–29.

⁵ Cawkwell, "Olynthus" 134–40.

⁶ So generally the views of Parke, Brunt, Carter, and Hammond and Griffith (above, note 1). Cawkwell's "Eubulus," of course, has done much to set the record straight; although in Cawkwell's "Olynthus" and "Euboea" there is little to be found on economic concerns shaping political and military decisions.

⁷ See Plut. *Mor* 812F; A. Motzki, *Eubulus von Probolinthos und seine Finanzpolitik* (Königsberg 1903) 16ff.; and Cawkwell, "Eubulus."

⁸ Literature on the Social War is, of course, extensive. A valuable starting point is S. Accame, *La Lega ateniese* (Rome 1941) 189ff. The following are more recent studies pertinent to the observations made here: G. T. Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century," in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, eds. P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (Cambridge 1978) 127–44; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley 1981) 131ff.; and G. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *JHS* 101 (1981) 40–55.

Dem. 15.3); and with defeat, the city's imperialistic ambitions, in evidence for over a decade, were checked.⁹ But most noteworthy for our purposes, by the end of the war total annual revenues in the city amounted only to 130 talents ([Dem.] 10.37). With Eubulus' ascendancy a radical shift occurred in the city's policies. Common alliance was pursued both as a defense against the threats posed by Persia, Phocis, and Philip and as a means of lessening for the city the relentless economic drain of military expenditures.¹⁰ Yet such alliances could not restore revenues. For this there was need of policies of a more pragmatic and specific sort.

Responding cautiously to the recommendations of Xenophon's *de Vectigalibus*,¹¹ Eubulus looked to the mines and the Piraeus as the chief means of restoring the city's finances. Indeed, since the fifth century these had served as the city's principal regular sources of revenue,¹² though since the 370s the leasing of the Laureion concessions had provided revenues of only modest size.¹³ Innovation marked Xenophon's recommendations concerning the mines,¹⁴ the most noteworthy of which was to point out the profit to be realized from state ownership of slaves leased to those renting the concessions (Xen. *Vect.* 4.13–18). Eubulus, however, elected not to follow Xenophon here, but instead adopted the fiscally more conservative approach of encouraging greater private investment in the concessions themselves.¹⁵ By moving in this way, Eubulus reduced the liability to the state in owning large numbers of slaves, and while he may have opened himself up to the charge of his friends' profiting from the state's enterprises (Dem. 3.29), the success of his strategy could not in the end be gainsaid (Dem. 8.45). Indeed, Crosby has suggested that by 341 B.C. the Laureion concessions may

⁹ Viz. the sending of cleruchies to Samos in 365 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 18.8.9), the efforts to regain control of Amphipolis beginning perhaps in 369 B.C. (Aeschin. 2.31), the capture by Timotheus of Pydna and Methone in the late 360s (Din. 1.14; 3.17; Dem. 4.4), and the capture and sending of cleruchies to Potidaea (Tod, *GHI* 2.146). While as Cargill (above, note 8) 161–88 emphasizes, these acts were not in contravention of the terms of the decree of Aristotle, they could have done little to reassure the allies about the likely renewal of Athens' imperialistic ambitions; see Griffith (above, note 8) 135–42, and Cawkwell (above, note 8) 51–55.

¹⁰ See Cawkwell, "Eubulus" 52–53, and T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965) 90ff.

¹¹ See Cawkwell, "Eubulus" 63, notes 89, 90, and 91.

¹² See A. M. Andreades, *A History of Greek Public Finance* I, transl., rev., ed. C. N. Brown (Cambridge 1933) 268–305, and M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley 1973) 131ff.

¹³ See R. J. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C." *BSA* 48 (1953) 253, based on M. Crosby, "The Leases of the Laureion Mines," *Hesperia* 19 (1950) 205–25.

¹⁴ See P. Gauthier, *Un Commentaire historique des Poroi de Xenophon* (Geneva and Paris 1976) 112.

¹⁵ Specifically by granting investors exemption from liturgies; see Hopper (above, note 13) 251, note 376.

have produced as much as 160 of the 400 talents of revenue then annually raised by the city.¹⁶

Yet Xenophon was of the opinion (*Vect.* 3.1)—by no means unique to him—that as a source of revenue the Piraeus possessed a potential that was unmatched (Isoc. 4.42; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.7). The empire had provided clear evidence of this (Thuc. 2.38.2; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.7.11–12); and the commercial revival experienced under the Second Confederacy would have done nothing to undercut it.¹⁷ Yet with the disasters of the Social War, the continued realization of this potential had been seriously jeopardized. From Isocrates (8.21) we learn that as a consequence of the war the city was deserted by its *emporoi*, its metic and foreign population: a fact too little stressed. But it was, we know, the enterprising metic and foreign population that dominated Athenian commerce. The docks were worked and the fleet was manned in no small measure by metics and foreigners.¹⁸ Yet more critically, it was the metic and foreign population that effectively controlled investment in commercial endeavors.¹⁹ With their exodus at the end of the Social War, then, we have clear evidence of a collapse in commerce and the revenues derived from it. So too we have evidence of a collapse in revenues derived indirectly from a thriving commerce: the tax on foreigners selling in the agora (Dem. 57.23), the *metoikion*,²⁰ and to a lesser extent perhaps the sales tax on goods sold in the agora.²¹ Indeed, while a variety of factors undoubtedly contributed to the economic difficulties of the late 350s, the crisis in revenues, it would appear, was occasioned principally by the collapse in income derived from commerce.

Xenophon, of course, was well aware of the gravity of the situation. The entire second section of *de Vectigalibus* and portions of the third are devoted to recommendations on ways in which residency in the city might be made more attractive to non-citizens, both resident and visiting (*Vect.* 2, 3.3–5). That Eubulus responded favorably to certain of these is clear. We know, for instance, that by the end of the century the metic population in Athens had risen to 10,000 (Ath. 6.272C), and from

¹⁶ Hopper (above, note 13) 253.

¹⁷ The size of this revival can only be inferred. Leucon's exemptions likely made the Piraeus a center for the distribution of grain (Dem. 20.30–33). Moreover, other goods were imported in large quantity (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.11–12). Furthermore, a large portion of the banker Pasion's fortune was probably amassed during these years (Dem. 36.4–6), no small part of which apparently was derived from his successful investment in bottomry loans (see Dem. 27.11; [Dem.] 52.34; 49.29–30).

¹⁸ See M. Amit, "Athens and the Sea," *Latomus* 74 (1965) 30–49 and 81–88.

¹⁹ See H. Knorringa, *Emporos* (Amsterdam 1926) 79ff. and R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques* (Leiden 1968) 62ff.

²⁰ On the *metoikion* (12 drachmas for men and 6 for women), see M. Clerc, *Les mèteques athéniens* (Paris 1893) 15ff.

²¹ See Pollux, *Onom.* 7.17 and Andreades (above, note 12) 294–95.

remarks to be found in the Demosthenic corpus their presence in the city in the late 350s and 340s was recognized as a matter of fact (see e.g. Dem. 23.23; 21.163; 57.48; 22.68; 24.166). We know, moreover, that during Eubulus' ascendancy legislative reforms were enacted requiring that commercial suits be heard monthly.²² The intent of the legislation, as Xenophon makes clear (*Vect.* 3.3–5), was to attract to the city greater numbers of foreign merchants. And if conclusions can be drawn from the *dikai emporikai* that survive in the Demosthenic corpus, the reforms seem to have accomplished their end.²³ We also know that under Eubulus' direction expenditures were made to improve the Emporium (whose facilities already were regarded by Demosthenes as one of the great legacies of the fifth century; see Dem. 22.76), and to make living conditions in the Piraeus generally more attractive (Din. 1.98; *SIG*³ 1216). It seems the point of Dinarchus' observation, in fact, that the work of Eubulus here was one of the signal achievements of his administration (Din. 1.96–97).

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that after the Social War suppression of privacy became a matter of public policy in a way that it had not been previously. We hear, for instance, of a decree proposed by a certain Moerocles, according to which Athens and its allies agreed to police the Aegean in defense of merchant traffic ([Dem.] 58.53).²⁴ The decree was no mere window-dressing, for we learn that subsequently, according to its terms, the island of Melos was to be fined ten talents for harboring pirates ([Dem.] 58.56). There was also a clause in the peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.) expressly denouncing acts of piracy ([Dem.] 12.2).

From all of this, it is apparent that the restoration of revenues derived from commerce, both directly and indirectly, was an issue of paramount concern to Eubulus. His efforts were varied and were implemented over a period of years; and as the construction that went on in the Piraeus makes clear, Eubulus, in restoring commercial revenues, was willing to invest directly from what were probably the still limited financial resources of the state, something he would not do in his efforts to restore mining revenues. Yet however encouraging this variety of activity

²² See L. Gernet, *Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1955) 173–200.

²³ For the dating of Dem. 32, [Dem.] 33, 34, 35, and 56 see S. Isager and M. H. Hansen, *Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C.*, tr. J. H. Rosenmeier (Odense University Press 1975 [1972]) 149, 154, 169–70, 208–9. In all but one of the suits the merchants or investors involved are not from Athens; see Dem. 32.4–5; [Dem.] 33.5; 35.1–2, 8. As Dionysodoros, the defendant in [Dem.] 56, is not charged explicitly with a violation of the grain laws, it is likely that he was not a resident of Attica. That the grain laws were aimed at residents of Attica seems clear from [Dem.] 34.37; 35.50 and 51; 56.6.

²⁴ Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes and Hypereides; see Timocles fr. 4 in CAF ap. Athenaeus 8.341E; the decree was earlier certainly than 344/3 B.C., the date of the speech.

may have been to the city's *emporoi*, it was on a strong navy that their confidence would in fact depend. It is, I think, in the context of Eubulus' commitment to make the Aegean secure that the military and political decisions of 349/8 B.C. can be seen as issuing from economic concerns, if not from what may in fact be regarded as a program of commercial recovery.

From Dinarchus (1.96) we know of Eubulus' efforts to maintain the fleet and build new docks, and from epigraphic remains it seems certain that during the late 350s and 340s the number of triremes available to the city was something more than 350.²⁵ Of course, this enormous armada would not all have been used at any one time. Even at fourth-century rates, pay for a fleet of such size, if kept on active duty for an extended period, would have been staggering.²⁶ On the contrary, the city sent out squadrons of no more than thirty even for its more important military commitments.²⁷ Yet military campaigning, it should be stressed, seems not to have been the principal preoccupation of the fleet during these years. Philip's fleet, after all, effectively numbered no more than twenty,²⁸ and as we shall see it was used chiefly for acts of piracy.

More typically, Athenian triremes were used to police the Aegean, to keep traffic lanes open, and to protect vital coastal areas (Dem. 18.301–2). Insuring the safe conveyance of grain was, we know, a major preoccupation of the state (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.4; [Dem.] 35.41; Tod, *GHI* 2.167). For this, squadrons of up to twenty triremes were called into service to guard convoys of grain carriers as they passed through the Hellespont and moved southwestward toward Attica (Dem. 18.73, 77). Yet the size of even these protective squadrons was probably unusual; the vital importance of the commodity and the dangers of Hellespontine passage presumably necessitated the taking of special precautions. In fact, though the evidence is limited, it would appear that most of the policing activity that went on was carried out by squadrons of no more than five, and patrols of one or two triremes apparently were in no way unusual (Dem. 8.24–26). Indeed, that the Athenian fleet was the police force of the Aegean was a fact acknowledged by Philip ([Dem.] 7.14–15), and that the allies who remained in the Confederacy after the war

²⁵ At the start of the Social War, Athens possessed 283 triremes (*IG* ii² 1611.5–9); by 353/2 B.C. that number had increased to 349 (*IG* ii² 1613.302), and by 330/29 B.C. it was 392 (*IG* ii² 1627.266–69).

²⁶ Pay for sailors in the fifth century had been a drachma a day (Thuc. 3.17.4), though by the turn of the century it had been reduced to 3 obols (Thuc. 8.45.2 and Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4–7). On the assumption that the latter figure was the wage paid in the 350s and 340s a fleet of 400 triremes would require in pay 200 talents per month.

²⁷ See e.g. Polyaeus *Strat.* 4.2.22; Diod. Sic. 16.34.3; 16.35.5; Dem. 3.4–6; 21.161; 4.16. 21–22; *IG* ii² 1613.297; *FGrH* 328 F 49–51.

²⁸ See Hammond and Griffith (above, note 1) 312, note 1.

continued to pay the *syntaxeis* seems a further indication of the fleet's success in keeping the seas generally secure.²⁹

Despite the certainty of the fleet's effectiveness in patrolling the Aegean, we are reduced almost wholly to guess-work when attempting to develop precise estimates of the revenues derived from a revived commerce. We know that by 341 B.C. revenues generally had been restored to 400 talents ([Dem.] 10.37–39; Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 166), and of this amount, as we saw, as much as 160 talents may have come from the leasing of the Laureion concessions. Furthermore, as we earlier observed, total revenue in 354 B.C. had amounted only to 130 talents; mining revenues had contributed modestly to this total, as, probably, had harbor revenues derived chiefly from the import of grain. If, to keep our guess-work simple, we were to imagine that the Laureion concessions had contributed nothing to the total revenues of 354 B.C., we still would have for 341 B.C. a net increase of 110 talents. (The increase in fact, however, would have been more.) Whether revenues derived from commerce constituted the bulk of this increase we do not know, although it does seem probable. After all, a significant portion of Eubulus' entire economic recovery program had been aimed precisely at such an end; and there would seem little point to the investments made, in maintaining and enlarging the fleet and in the construction work done in the Piraeus, if returns of some significant size were not to be realized. Nor should we be put off by the idea that commercial revenues could have amounted annually to 100 talents or more.³⁰ Xenophon's observation about the potential of the Piraeus should provide some measure of reassurance. And the fact that Cersobleptes was able to raise in harbor taxes at least 200 talents annually should provide more (Dem. 23.110).³¹ In fact, it seems likely that as the revenue crisis of 354

²⁹ While the whole issue of the *syntaxeis* is much clouded, it may be the case that the allies paid a portion of their tax directly to the commanders of these small squadrons, in compensation for services rendered and in proportion to the size of the squadrons; see Dem. 8.24–26; Cawkwell (above, note 8) 48; and R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States* (Berkeley 1976) 433.

³⁰ The question of the quantity of revenues regularly derived from the harbor tax has been a matter of debate for some time. For a survey of the major arguments, see in addition to Andreades (above, note 12) 297–99 and Knorrिंगa (above, note 19) 132–39 the following: J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*. tr. L. M. Fraser and D. C. MacGregor (London 1933) 158–68; H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1958²) 224–30. Also of note are the observations of Cl. Mossé, *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* (Paris 1962) 110–32, and E. Erxleben, "Das Verhältnis des Handels zum Produktions aufkommen in Attica im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. u. Z." *Klio* 57.2 (1975) 365–98. The evidence, unfortunately, allows for no decisive conclusion, although the figures cited by Andocides (1.133), I believe, are grossly misleading for the amount of revenue that would have been secured in times of normal prosperity.

³¹ Cersobleptes' revenues were secured through a tithe apparently (Dem. 23.177) imposed on the traffic of a limited number of items; see S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 52–79.

B.C. was occasioned principally by a disastrous drop in commercial revenues, so the recovery in 341 B.C. was occasioned in no small measure by their restoration.

III

Apart from pirates, it was Philip in the 350s and 340s who posed the single largest threat to Athenian shipping and to Aegean commerce generally.³² We hear, for instance, of his raids on the sea-borne commerce of Athens' allies during the 350s (Dem. 4.34). From the same source, we know of his raids on Lemnos and Imbros, and of his seizure of shipping at Geraestus on the southern tip of Euboea. These latter raids, to be sure, were aimed directly at Athens, and at its grain supply in particular.

According to Demosthenes, at least half the grain consumed at Athens came from the northeast (Dem. 20.31–32). Imbros and Lemnos lay directly on the grain route, and the southern tip of Euboea had to be bypassed as the grain was moved southwestward toward Attica. So vital were Imbros and Lemnos (as well as Scyros) to Athens' grain supply that the islands had been ceded to the city as part of the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31), and since about 370 B.C. may have been garrisoned by cleruchies.³³ These raids, we may imagine, were not meant by Philip to effect a permanent stoppage in Athens' grain supply. For this, he would have had to blockade the Piraeus, and barring that, grain, however dear, was available elsewhere.³⁴ Rather, we may imagine that Philip sought with these raids to secure booty for himself, to squeeze the city's food supply, and above all over the long run to strain the city's financial resources.

Nor were these the only assaults that Philip made on merchant traffic in the Aegean, though they were certainly among the most direct. By 350 B.C. Philip had gained control of virtually all the emporia of the northwest, and though his principal objective here was certainly not to deny Athens access to these centers, that, we know, was one of the effects (Dem. 2.16–17).

Still, while doubtless troublesome, these acts of harrassment had only a limited effect on Athenian commercial revenues. We hear of no serious financial difficulties caused by them; the economy generally continued to revive in the 340s, and as has been argued, commercial revenues were a vital part of the recovery process. Moreover, with the recovery of the

³² On piracy, see Dem. 23.166; [Dem.] 7.2; 12.13.

³³ See G. Cawkwell, "The date of *IG ii*² 1609 again," *Historia* 22 (1973) 259–61; see also Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62.2.

³⁴ See L. Gernet, *L'Approvisionnement d'Athènes en blé au Ve et au IVe siècles* (Paris 1909) 271–391.

Chersonese in 352 B.C. and the retaking of Imbros and Lemnos, the grain supply from the northeast was made reasonably secure (Dem. 23.14; Diod. Sic. 16.34.3; *IG* ii² 1613.297). The fleet's effectiveness generally in policing the Aegean was a recognized fact, though the fleet may not have been successful in thwarting every act of aggression.

Had Macedonia gained control of Euboea, on the other hand, the threat to Athenian commerce would have been of a different sort altogether. Even Demosthenes in the end became conscious of that fact. A safe Euboea, as we saw, was vital to the protection of the flow of grain from the northeast, no less certainly than were Imbros, Lemnos or the Hellespont. But Euboea was unique. With its strategic location, the island possessed the potential to dominate the northwest and west coasts of Attica, the Cyclades, in fact virtually the entire western Aegean. As Demosthenes was to acknowledge finally, the loss of the island to Philip would have been tantamount to the closing of the Piraeus to all commercial traffic. The sea would have been rendered useless: ἄπλους δ' ἡ θάλαττα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὀρμωμένων ληστῶν γέγονεν (Dem. 18.241). For unlike the grain supply, commercial traffic did not move in convoys; nor could it move along a single path, protected everywhere by squadrons of triremes.

By 349/8 B.C. the Theoric Commission was in place, exercising control over military spending, and the program of financial recovery was underway, however much a fledgling.³⁵ When the appeal for help came from Olynthus, it was answered with squadrons already on active duty.³⁶ There is no question that Cawkwell is correct in noting that a protracted struggle in the north could have been financially disastrous for Athens. And even if Athens had been successful in driving Philip from the peninsula, there is no reason to imagine that the emporia of the area would have been opened again to Athenian commercial traffic. Such cynicism may not have entered the debate; but to anyone with an eye for economic reality, it ought to have been clear that much could be lost in the northwest, and not much gained. With Plutarch's call for assistance, on the other hand, matters were different. Even the threat of Philip's presence in Euboea, if it went unanswered, could have upended the program of commercial revival before it began. *Emporoi*, metics, and *xenoi* were not likely to chance returning to the city, to invest in its commercial recovery, if the city would not invest in them. It was vital to Eubulus' program that he act. Plutarch's faithlessness complicated the situation, but that was resolved when Eretria was handed over to the people. The subsequent capture of Molossus was a further complication (Plut. *Phocion* 13.4–14.1), and the peace that followed was inglorious to

³⁵ Cawkwell, "Eubulus" 53–61.

³⁶ Cawkwell, "Olynthus" 130–32.

be sure (Dem. 5.5 and schol.).³⁷ But for a while at least Euboea was safe from Philip,³⁸ and Eubulus' program of recovery went on.

³⁷ Though it may be the case that Eubulus received assurances that Callias and the burgeoning pan-Euboean movement were no more likely to tolerate active interference from Macedon than they had from Athens. For how else might Callias have offended Philip (see Aeschin. 3.89–90) save in refusing in return for Macedonian aid to allow Philip to use the island against Athens?

³⁸ See Cawkwell, "Euboea" 46ff., whose arguments against Brunt (above, note 1) 251ff. are decisive in this matter.